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Bullock v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt.,  
No. 4:20-cv-00062-BMM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177029  
(D. Mont. Sept. 25, 2020). 
Henry O’Brien 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the four years of the Trump administration, five people 
exercised the powers of the Director of the Bureau of Land Management; 
none were appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate nor 
formally appointed as acting officials under the Federal Vacancies Reform 
Act of 1998 (“FVRA”).1 Montana Governor Steve Bullock and the Mon-
tana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (collectively, 
“Plaintiffs”) sued BLM and Secretary of the Interior David Bernhardt 
(collectively, “BLM”) in the United States District Court for the District 
of Montana, alleging the current head of BLM, William Perry Pendley, 
had no authority to lead BLM and his actions as Director of BLM 
(“Director”) were therefore invalid. 2  Bullock v. BLM highlights 
longstanding and continuing conflict between the executive branch’s 
appointments power and the Senate’s duty to advise and consent.  
II. FACTS AND BACKGROUND  
A. Factual Background  
Under the Trump administration, BLM operated for four years 
without a Senate-confirmed Director.3 Like other Principal Officers of the 
United States, the Director must be appointed by the President, with the 
advice and consent of the Senate.4 Such positions are often referred to as 
Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation offices (“PAS 
offices”).5  
On the last day of the Obama administration, the outgoing 
Secretary of the Interior issued Order 3345 to temporarily delegate the 
“functions, duties, and responsibilities” of various Interior PAS offices, 
including the Director, to career employees. 6  The order limited the 
 
 
1. Bullock v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 4:20-cv-00062-
BMM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177029, *4 (D. Mont. Sept. 25, 2020) [hereinafter 
Bullock I]. 
2. Id. at *1–3.  
3. Bullock I, at *3. 
4. U.S. CONST. Art II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring senatorial advice and consent 
for all non-inferior officers).  
5. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. SW Gen., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 
931, 934 (2017).   
6. Secretary Sally Jewell, Temporary Redelegation of Authority for 
Certain Vacant Non-Career Senate-confirmed Positions, Order No. 3345, 2017 DEP 
SE LEXIS 3 (Jan. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Order 3345].  
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delegation to duties not required by law to be performed exclusively by 
PAS officials.7 
Over the next three years, the Department of the Interior (“Inte-
rior”) amended Order 3345 to re-delegate the duties of Director of BLM 
to five different people.8 The fifth was Deputy Director of Policy and Pro-
grams William Perry Pendley, who assumed the duties on July 29, 2019.9 
In total, Interior amended the order 32 times, including four times to ex-
tend Pendley’s tenure.10 In May, 2020, Pendley authored a memo (“Pend-
ley Memo”) declaring the Deputy Director of Policy and Programs to be 
the first assistant to the Director for FVRA purposes, and delegating to 
himself the “functions, duties, and responsibilities” of the Director.11 
Order 3345, as originally written, was intended to allow continu-
ous agency leadership during the transition between the Obama and Trump 
administrations in January 2017.12 The order cites Reorganization Plan No. 
3 of 1950 for authority—a directive which vests all authority of Interior in 
the Secretary and allows the Secretary to, “from time to time,” delegate 
“any function of the Secretary” to any employee of Interior.13  
On July 30, 2020, ten days after Plaintiffs filed this suit, President 
Trump formally nominated Pendley to the office of Director of BLM.14 
President Trump withdrew Pendley’s nomination on September 8, 2020, 
but Pendley continued to lead BLM.15 
B. BLM 
BLM manages 245 million acres16 of public land, almost exclu-
sively in the West and Alaska.17 Most of this land is arid or semi-arid and 
represents America’s unwanted, left-over lands—those unclaimed when 
the era of public land disposal ended.18 BLM also manages all 700 million 
acres of federally-owned mineral rights.19 The agency is led by a Director, 
who is a PAS officer.20 
 
 
7. Id. § 4.  
8. Bullock I, at *5.  
9. Id.; Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Expedited Mot. for Summ. J. 5, Sept. 9, 
2020, No. 4:20-CV-00062-BMM.  
10. Bullock I, at *5.  
11. Memo from William Perry Pendley to Casey Hammond, Designation 
of Successors for Presidentially-Appointed, Senate-Confirmed Positions, United 
States Department of the Interior, 1 (May 22, 2020).  
12. Order 3345, supra note 34, § 1.  
13. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1950, 64 Stat. 1262, §§ 1, 3, 15 Fed. 
Reg. 3174, (May 24, 1950).  
14. Bullock I, at *7.  
15. Id.  
16.  Bullock I, at *3. 
17. GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES 
LAW, 26 (7th ed. 2014).  
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Bullock I, at *3.  
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Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 21 
(“FLPMA”), BLM must develop, maintain, and revise Resource Manage-
ment Plans (“RMPs”), which dictate how particular lands will be used.22 
FLPMA also requires BLM to “provide for meaningful public in-
volvement of State and local government officials” when preparing 
RMPs.23 Anyone with an interest in a RMP and who participates in the 
planning process, may file a protest with Director.24 Regulations require 
the Director to respond to and resolve properly filed protests.25 
C. Appointments 
The Senate’s confirmation authority acts as an important check on 
the power wielded by the executive branch through the modern 
administrative agencies. The confirmation process, though, can be cum-
bersome.26 Congress has long allowed the President to appoint interim of-
ficers, understanding that these offices may sometimes need to be filled 
quickly.27  
The earliest statutes allowing temporary officers to serve before 
being confirmed by the Senate were passed in the 1790s.28 Those early 
statutes limited acting officers to several critical cabinet positions but did 
not limit who could be appointed. 29  Reforms in the 1860s aimed at 
preventing executive evasion of senatorial advice and consent powers 
culminated in the Vacancies Act of 1868 (“Vacancies Act”). 30  The 
Vacancies Act repealed all existing, conflicting statutes and allowed 
interim officers to serve in PAS positions for a maximum of ten days at 
any executive department. 31  In 1891, the duration increased to thirty 
days,32 and in 1988, Congress extended it to 120 days.33  
Despite Congress’s attempts to assert the Senate’s confirmation 
power, the late twentieth century saw the Vacancies Act increasingly 
 
 
21. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1784.  
22. 43 U.S.C. § 1712; 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0–5(n); Norton v. S. Utah 
Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 69 (2004).  
23. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9); 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–2. 
24. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5–2.  
25. Id. § 1610.5–2(a)(3), (b).   
26. Id. at 929, 934–35. 
27. SW Gen., 137 S. Ct. at 935.  
28. Id. at 935 (citing Act of July 23, 1868, ch. 227, 15 Stat. 168; Act of 
Feb. 20, 1863, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 656).  
29. Id. (citing Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 37, § 8, 1 Stat. 2, which included 
only the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and War).  
30. MORTON ROSENBERG, THE NEW VACANCIES ACT: CONGRESS ACTS 
TO PROTECT THE SENATE’S CONFIRMATION PREROGATIVE, Congressional Research 
Service Report No. 98-892, 6 (Nov. 2, 1998); SW Gen.., 137 S. Ct. at 935. 
31. Act of July 23, 1868, ch. 227, 15 Stat. 168.  
32. SW Gen.., 137 S. Ct. at 935.  
33. Presidential Transitions Effectiveness Act, 102 Stat. 985, § 
7(a)(1)(B).  
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circumvented by the executive branch. 34  Beginning in 1973, the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) argued the Vacancies Act was not the 
exclusive method for designating interim officials.35 DOJ argued that any 
executive agency with an organic act vesting all powers of the agency in a 
single person and providing for that person to delegate their power could 
designate an interim official without complying with the Vacancies Act.36 
This approach spread to other agencies, and in 1998 nearly twenty percent 
of PAS offices were held by unconfirmed, interim appointees in excess of 
the 120-day limit.37 
President Clinton’s 1997 appointment of Bill Lann Lee as Acting 
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights likely spurred an additional 
Vacancies Act revision.38 Clinton originally nominated Mr. Lee through 
an ordinary Appointments Clause procedure. However, when Republicans 
controlling the Senate Judiciary Committee vowed to vote down the nom-
ination, President Clinton threatened a recess appointment, reconsidered, 
and made the “Acting” appointment.39 The only basis for Mr. Lee’s in-
terim appointment was the DOJ opinion, as he did not qualify for an in-
terim appointment under the Vacancies Act.40 The acting appointment 
frustrated many, as Mr. Lee had been functionally rejected for a PAS of-
fice by the Senate.41 In response, Congress passed FVRA in 1998.42 
D. FVRA 
Unlike the Vacancies Act, FVRA states expressly that it repre-
sents the exclusive means of making acting appointments, unless another 
 
 
34. SW Gen., 137 S. Ct. at 935–36; MORTON ROSENBERG, THE NEW 
VACANCIES ACT: CONGRESS ACTS TO PROTECT THE SENATE’S CONFIRMATION 
PREROGATIVE, Congressional Research Service Report No. 98-892, 6 (Nov. 2, 1998). 
35. MORTON ROSENBERG, THE NEW VACANCIES ACT: CONGRESS ACTS 
TO PROTECT THE SENATE’S CONFIRMATION PREROGATIVE, Congressional Research 
Service Report No. 98-892, 1 (Nov. 2, 1998); THE VACANCIES ACT, 22 Op. O.L.C. 44, 
45 (March, 18, 1998) (“ For decades, the Department of Justice has taken the position 
that statutes vesting an agency's powers in the agency head and allowing delegation 
to subordinate officials may be used to assign, on an interim basis, the powers of 
certain vacant Senate-confirmed offices”). 
36. Id.  
37. SW Gen., 137 S. Ct. at 936.  
38. See MORTON ROSENBERG, THE NEW VACANCIES ACT: CONGRESS 
ACTS TO PROTECT THE SENATE’S CONFIRMATION PREROGATIVE, Congressional 
Research Service Report No. 98-892, 1 (Nov. 2, 1998). 
39. David L. Jordan, Separation of Powers: The Appointment of Bill 
Lann Lee as Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, 26 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 935, 935–36 (Summer 1999).  
40. Id. at 938. 
41. MORTON ROSENBERG, THE NEW VACANCIES ACT: CONGRESS ACTS 
TO PROTECT THE SENATE’S CONFIRMATION PREROGATIVE, Congressional Research 
Service Report No. 98-892, 1, 6–8 (Nov. 2, 1998). 
42. 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–3349(d) (2020). 
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statute specifically provides otherwise.43 Additionally, FVRA invalidates 
the Department of Justice opinion used to make non-FVRA conforming 
appointments, such as that for Bill Lann Lee.44 
FVRA allows vacant PAS offices to be filled in three ways. The 
default is for the “first assistant to the office” to become the acting 
officer.45 Alternatively, the President can appoint another PAS officer to 
the office.46 Finally, the President can appoint a high-level employee of 
the agency if that person worked at the agency for more than ninety days 
in the year before the vacancy.47 FVRA does not allow, in most cases, a 
person to serve in an acting capacity if they have been formally nominated 
to fill the office.48 
 Acting officers under FVRA may not serve longer than 210 days 
from the beginning of the vacancy.49 This time limit is extended in some 
circumstances, such as when Congress rejects a formal nominee or ad-
journs.50 
 FVRA has teeth. It states that any action taken by an unlawfully 
serving officer, while performing a function or duty of the vacant office, 
“shall have no force or effect” and “may not be ratified.”51 The functions 
or duties referred to in the statute apply only to mandatory functions or 
duties that must be performed by the PAS officer.52 
III. SUMMARY JUDGEMENT ORDER 
Plaintiffs moved for expedited summary judgment before BLM 
responded to the Complaint.53 BLM argued Plaintiffs did not have stand-
ing in this matter because they had not been injured.54 Furthermore, BLM 




43. 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a).   
44. Id. § 3347(b).  
45. Id. § 3345(a)(1).  
46. Id. § 3345(a)(2).  
47. Id. § 3345(a)(3) (here, “high-level” means an employee compensated 
at or above the GS-15 level). 
48. Id. § 3345(b).  
49. Id. § 3346.  
50. Id. § 3346(b)–(c).  
51. Id. § 3348(d).  
52. Id. § 3348(a)(2).  
53. Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Expedited Mot. for Summ. J. 1–2, Sept. 9, 2020, 
No. 4:20-CV-00062-BMM. 
54.  Bullock v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 4:20-cv-00062-
BMM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177029, *2 (D. Mont. Sept. 25, 2020). 
55. Id. at *8, 22–23.  




Any plaintiff invoking federal jurisdiction must establish standing 
by proving they suffered an injury caused by the defendant that is 
redressable by the court.56 
 Plaintiffs advanced three injuries to establish standing,57 alleging 
that under Pendley’s direction, BLM (1) failed to uphold its commitment 
to prevent degradation to sage-grouse habitat by reneging on conservation 
policies;58 (2) revised two RMPs for BLM lands in Montana;59 (3) injured 
the state of Montana in its sovereign capacity.60 The court did not reach 
the merits of the first, and most speculative, argument because it 
determined standing was established by both of the Plaintiffs’ other ar-
guments.61  
1. Procedural Injury from RMP Revision 
Generally, an injury must be an “actual or imminent invasion of a 
legally protected right that is concrete and particularized,” not merely 
speculative. 62  However, a plaintiff claiming injury from a violated 
procedural right “can assert that right without meeting all the normal 
standards for redressability and immediacy.”63 Instead, the plaintiff must 
show the procedures allegedly violated were “designed to protect some 
threatened concrete interest . . . .” 64  Importantly, plaintiffs asserting 
procedural rights do not need to prove the outcome would have been 
different had the right not been violated.65 
The court characterized Plaintiffs’ second standing argument—in-
jury from Pendley’s oversight of the revision and coordination process for 
RMPs covering the Missoula and Lewiston areas—as a procedural 
 
 
56. Id. at *8 (citing Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 
(1992)).  
57. Id. at *8.  
58. Id. at *9 (referencing Mont. Wildlife Fed’n v. Bernhardt, No. CV-18-
69-GF-BMM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90571 (D. Mont. May 22) appeal docketed, No. 
20-35658 (9th Cir. July 22, 2020), which set aside those policy changes).  
59. Id. at *10.  
60. Id. at *11–12.  
61. Id. at *9–12 (questioning the first theory as lacking specificity, but 
noting Plaintiffs likely had standing under this theory “in the same way that a bank 
had standing to challenge the recess appointment of the Director of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau” in State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 795 F.3d 48, 
53 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). 
62. Id. at *16 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 
(2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
63. Id. at *10–11 (quoting Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 
n.7 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
64. Id. at *12 (quoting WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 795 
F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
65. Id. at *17.  
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injury.66 The court found Plaintiffs had a concrete interest in their right to 
comment on the RMP revision process and protest to the Director, and 
they exercised that right by commenting on the draft RMPs that the 
proposed revisions would lead to injuries to wildlife, cultural, and 
recreational resources in the state.67  
The court dismissed BLM’s argument that Plaintiffs needed to 
show more specifically how the RMP revisions injured their agenda68 and 
found injury in Plaintiffs’ allegation that Pendley engaged in the state 
consultation process while unlawfully acting as the Director.69 The court 
reasoned that if Pendley served unlawfully, Plaintiffs’ protest and 
comments were not heard by an official with the power to address their 
concerns.70 Therefore, a procedural injury was suffered during the RMP 
revision process and occurred regardless of the RMPs’ impact on the 
state’s resources.71  
2. Injury to Sovereign Interests 
States are not treated as ordinary litigants in standing analyses, 
due to their “special position and interest” as sovereigns.72 Instead, states 
are entitled to “special solicitude”73 and can establish standing based on 
injuries to the resources in their domain.74  
The court found injury to Plaintiff’s interests because any 
unlawful actions by Pendley as Director would improperly infringe on 
Plaintiffs’ sovereignty over the “land, water, air, and wildlife” in the 
state.75 BLM manages almost a third of Montana’s lands and Plaintiffs 
have standing to protect their interests in that territory.76  
Having found Plaintiff’s properly established standing under two 
theories, the court turned to the merits of the case. 
B. FVRA and Appointments Clause 
BLM argued Pendley was not the Acting Director of BLM, but 
rather remained Deputy Director for Policy and Programs and was merely 
 
 
66. Id. at *10–11. Pls.’ Br. in Supp. of Expedited Mot. for Summ. J. 9–
11, July 7, 2020, No. 4:20-CV-00062-BMM. 
67. Id. at *15; Pls.’ Compl. ¶¶ 65–76, July 7, 2020, No. 4:20-CV-00062-
BMM. 
68. Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Expedited Mot. for Summ. J. 14–15, Sept. 9, 
2020, No. 4:20-CV-00062-BMM.  
69. Id. at *14.  
70. Id. at *15–16.   
71. See id. at *14–16.  
72. Id. at *18 (quoting Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 
497, 518 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
73. Id. at *19 (quoting Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
74. Id. at *18.  
75. Id. at *19.  
76. Id. at *18–19.  
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exercising the delegated authority of the Director.77 Therefore, Pendley’s 
authority came not from FVRA, but from Order 3345 and thereafter the 
Pendley Memo.78  
The court determined neither of those sources provided alternative, 
valid authorization for Pendley to serve as Acting Director or exercise the 
duties and function of the Director.79 The court then found Pendley had 
acted as Director without authorization under FVRA and in violation of 
the Appointments Clause.80 
1. Order 3345 and the Pendley Memo Were Invalid 
The court found Order 3345 had no legal authority and rejected 
BLM’s distinction between an acting director and an employee exercising 
the duties and functions of the Director.81 BLM argued the duties of a PAS 
office can be delegated to an agency employee for at least as long as 
Pendley had been serving without offending the Appointments Clause.82 
The court found this argument flawed because the authority cited by BLM 
held only that Congress is empowered to allow the President temporary 
appointees, as it had in FVRA.83 The court underscored that FVRA is the 
exclusive method for designating acting PAS officers.84 
The court similarly dismissed the Pendley Memo as an alternative 
to proper FVRA procedure because the memo did not cite to any authority 
for its declarations and BLM did not provide any.85  
2. Pendley Operated as Acting Director 
Despite BLM’s claim that Pendley was only exercising the duties 
of the Director, the court found two factors indicated Pendley “operated as 
the Acting BLM Director.”86 First, and most significantly, Pendley “exer-
cised powers reserved to the BLM Director.”87 For instance, the adminis-
trative record established that Pendley had reviewed and denied protests 
 
 
77. Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Expedited Mot. for Summ. J. 16, Sept. 9, 2020, 
No. 4:20-CV-00062-BMM. 
78. Id. at *22–23.  
79. Id. at *24–26.  
80. Id. at *26–34.  
81. Id. at *26–27 (“the Executive Branch cannot use wordplay to avoid 
constitutional and statutory requirements”).   
82. Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Expedited Mot. for Summ. J. 16–19, Sept. 9, 
2020, No. 4:20-CV-00062-BMM (citing United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 333, 
343 (1898)).  
83. Bullock I, at *27–28.  
84. Id. at *28.  
85. Id. at *28–29. At oral argument, BLM, for the first time, offered 
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1950 as authorization for the Pendley Memo. The court 
rejected this authority as facially invalid. Id. 
86. Id. at *30.  
87. Id. at *29.  
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to RMPs, which is a function the BLM Director must perform.88 Second, 
the court noted that Pendley presented himself and was referred to in offi-
cial documents as Acting BLM Director.89 BLM insisted these references 
were inadvertent. The court conceded the references were not dispositive, 
but still found they reinforced “what was already established through del-
egation and practice . . . .”90 
3. BLM Violated FVRA and the Appointments Clause 
The court found Order 3345 and the Pendley Memo invalid, and 
therefore Pendley’s tenure could only be justified under FVRA.91 BLM 
did not argue Pendley was properly serving under FVRA and the court 
therefore held, in only a few sentences, that FVRA was violated.92  
The Pendley Memo attempted to designate Pendley’s office as the 
first assistant to the Director, but the court determined the memo was in-
valid. 93  Therefore, Pendley could not become Acting Director under 
FVRA’s default succession provision.94  
Pendley did not qualify for acting service under any other provi-
sion of FVRA for several reasons.95 Most importantly, the President had 
not selected Pendley to serve as Acting Director. Furthermore, BLM’s 
Deputy Director for Policy and Programs is not a PAS office, and Pendley 
had only been at BLM for two weeks when he was delegated directorial 
duties.96 Each of these facts alone made Pendley an invalid Acting Direc-
tor.97 Finally, the court noted Pendley had continued to serve as Acting 
Director while his formal nomination to the position was pending in the 
Senate—a clear FVRA violation.98 Because Pendley served as Acting Di-
rector with no legal basis, his term also violated the Appointments 
Clause.99 
As Pendley was never a valid Acting Director, his entire 424 days 
of service were held unlawful.100 
 
 
88. Id. (citing 43 C.F.R. §§ 1610.3-2(e), 1610.5-2(a)(3)). 
89. Id. at *30.  
90. Id.  
91. Id.   
92. Id. at *32.  
93. Id.  
94. Id. at *26, *31; 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1).  
95. Id. at *31.  
96. See Bullock I, at *31–32; Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Expedited Mot. for 
Summ. J. 5, Sept. 9, 2020, No. 4:20-CV-00062-BMM. 
97. See Bullock I, at *31–32.  
98. Id. at *32.  
99. Id. at *32.  
100. Id. at *36.  




The court fully granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment 
and enjoined Pendley from operating as Director. The order also directed 
the parties to submit briefs on which of Pendley’s acts the court should set 
aside under FVRA’s enforcement clause.101 In a later order,102 the court set 
aside only three Montana RMPs; the only relief Plaintiffs requested.103  
The Center for Biological Diversity and other conservation groups 
(“Conservation Groups”) moved to file an amicus brief before the Relief 
Order.104 The Conservation Groups signaled their brief would have de-
tailed other invalid Pendley actions that could be set aside.105 The court 
rejected the Conservation Groups’ motion because “amicus typically may 
not introduce an issue into a case or seek relief that is not raised or re-
quested by the parties.”106  
IV. CASE ANALYSIS 
The court in Bullock v. BLM struck down BLM’s attempts to ra-
tionalize Pendley’s role in a fairly cursory and facial manner. For example, 
the court did not investigate whether Order 3345 was effective under the 
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1950 or probe the limits of when an inferior 
officer may exercise the delegated functions or duties of a PAS office. 
Granted, the parties did not extensively brief these issues, but the court 
appeared to view Pendley’s service as BLM Director as an affront to the 
Appointments Clause and FVRA and swiftly found violations.107 This ap-
proach is especially clear when compared with the invalidation of two 
other acting, Trump administration PAS officers: Kenneth Cuccinelli II as 
Acting Director of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(“USCIS”),108 and Chad Wolf as Acting Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”).109  
Cases such as these suggest that even post-FVRA, there is signif-
icant room and motivation for the executive branch to push the legal limits 
of temporary appointments. 
 
 
101. Id. at * 36–37.  
102. Bullock v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., 4:20-cv-00062-
BMM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200801, (October 16, 2020) [hereinafter Bullock II]. 
103. Id. at *3, *12.  
104. Mot. for Leave to File Br. as Amici Curiae, No. 4:20-cv-00062-BMM 
(Oct. 5, 2020).  
105. See id.  
106. Bullock II, at *10.  
107. Bullock v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 4:20-cv-00062-
BMM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177029, *30–31 (D. Mont. Sept. 25, 2020). 
108. See L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. March 1, 2020). 
109. See Casa de Maryland, Inc. v. Wolf, No. 8:20-cv-02118-PX, 2020 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166613 (D. Md. Sept. 11, 2020); Vidal v. Wolf, No. 16-CV-4756, 
No. 17-CV-5228, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213068 (E.D. N.Y. Nov. 14, 2020). 
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A. Other Trump-Era Vacancies Cases 
Many administrations have pushed the legal limits of temporary 
appointments,110 but this and two other cases mentioned above suggest a 
pattern of deliberate FVRA evasion under the Trump administration. 
Cuccinelli considered whether Mr. Cuccinelli properly assumed the role 
of Acting Director of USCIS.111 When the Senate-confirmed Director of 
the USCIS resigned in June 2019, Deputy Director Mark Koumans ini-
tially assumed the Acting Director title, in conformance with FVRA.112 
However, nine days later, the Secretary of DHS created a new position in 
USCIS—Principal Deputy Director—and appointed Cuccinelli to that 
post. On the same day, the Secretary updated USCIS’s order of succession 
to make the newly-created Principal Deputy Director the first assistant to 
the Director.113 Under this reorganization, Cuccinelli was elevated above 
the former first assistant and assumed the Acting Director title.114 
Unlike in Bullock, the parties agreed Cuccinelli’s role could only 
be justified under FVRA. 115  The court held Cuccinelli’s role violated 
FVRA for a “fundamental and clear-cut reason” that was apparently not 
directly briefed by either party: Cuccinelli could not be an “assistant” if he 
had never served below any other official in the department.116 
In another example of Trump-era vacancies violations, Casa de 
Maryland and Vidal each found error in both Chad Wolf’s and his prede-
cessor, Kevin McAleenan’s, tenures as Acting Secretary of the DHS.117 
Courts have interpreted a 2016 amendment to the Homeland Security Act 
(“HSA”) to provide DHS a significant exception to FVRA.118 The excep-
tion allows Secretary of DHS to designate the DHS order of succession 
beyond the first two assistants notwithstanding FVRA, meaning those of-
ficials can serve in an acting capacity indefinitely.119 Accordingly, various 
DHS Secretaries made a practice of editing the order of succession for the 
agency to allow selected personnel occupying inferior positions to assume 
 
 
110. See MORTON ROSENBERG, THE NEW VACANCIES ACT: CONGRESS 
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115. Id. at 25.  
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U.S.C. 3345(a)(1) and citing opposing Office of Legal Counsel opinions). 
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U.S.C. 113(g), and noting Casa de Md., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166613 and Immigrant 
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acting PAS roles upon resignations.120 Mr. Wolf’s and Mr. McAleenan’s 
appointments were made under the HSA exception, not FVRA, but were 
nonetheless invalid because of what amounted to a paperwork error.121 
Although the DHS order of succession manipulation scheme was 
authorized outside of FVRA, it is still perhaps the perfection of the process 
attempted in Cuccinelli and Bullock. Secretaries of Departments without 
FVRA exceptions can appoint the administration’s desired candidate to an 
inferior, non-PAS position and update the order of succession memo. The 
outgoing PAS officer then can resign or be terminated, causing the desired 
candidate to lawfully assume the office for at least 210 days under 
FVRA.122 This process was not itself invalidated in Casa de Maryland or 
Vidal; the acting tenures were only found likely invalid because Mr. 
McAleenan ascended in direct contradiction to the order of succession 
memo.123 
Like in the case of Pendley, the facts of Cuccinelli’s appointment 
alone raise immediate specters of impropriety. The Cuccinelli decision dif-
fers, though, in its approach. The court, over several pages, engages in a 
textual analysis of the word “assistant” and incorporates the structure of 
FVRA.124 The Bullock ruling, though certainly not arbitrary or legally 
baseless, takes a blunter approach.125 
Bullock, in its bluntness, may stand for more than the other two 
cases. Unlike Casa de Maryland and Vidal, the Bullock decision was broad 
enough to invalidate the legal theory justifying invalid tenure.126 This con-
clusion is important because any agency could still use the order of suc-
cession scheme to populate PAS offices. 
There is also significance in the Bullock court’s swift dismissal of 
BLM’s attempts to retroactively justify Pendley’s role.127 All three cases 
 
 
120. Casa de Md., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166613 at *60. 
121. Vidal, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213068, *15–20, 35–37 (the 
“paperwork error” was the result of there being two memos detailing the order of 
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emergency; Mr. McAleenan was next-in-line under the catastrophic emergency memo, 
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that provision to allow for indefinite acting officials, but still found Mr. Wolf’s and 
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2020 Bullock v. BLM            13 
 
 
note the critical importance of Senate confirmation to the separation of 
powers and the clear intent of FVRA to preserve that function. However, 
only in Bullock does a court take a strong stand against allowing runa-
rounds of FVRA.  
B. Courts Should Scrutinize Acting  
Appointments for FVRA Violations 
Scrutiny of potentially extra-FVRA temporary appointments is re-
quired in order to maintain a balance between the Appointments Clause 
and the executive’s need to appoint bona fide acting officials. The im-
portance of both is recognized in the legislative history of the various Va-
cancies Acts.128 
As noted, one of the primary motivations for passing FVRA was 
to cure a Department of Justice opinion that allowed for perpetual tempo-
rary officials under the color of delegation if the agency vested all power 
in an office and allowed that officer to delegate some or all of that power. 
In rationalizing Pendley’s tenure, BLM advanced a nearly identical argu-
ment.129 Even after Bullock, BLM officials cited to the “important histori-
cal context” of the delegation of acting duties as an alternative to FVRA.130 
As Bullock does, courts should look to the history of the Vacancies 
Act and the clear intent of FVRA to resolve efforts by the executive branch 
to evade FVRA. If courts do not reject these attempts on a more than case-
by-case basis, Congress may have to act again to protect the advice and 
consent duty.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Due to the upcoming change in executive administration and the 
limited remedies requested by Plaintiffs, the direct effects of Bullock v. 
BLM may be limited and short-lived. The court did not appear to struggle 
to reach its determination, nor did the opinion introduce any consequential 
new rules. However, the directness of the ruling in the face of a clear at-
tempt to circumvent a legislative mandate is a refreshing and needed ap-
proach. Without more rulings of this nature at higher levels of the court 
system or legislative action, agencies will remain tempted to avoid the ad-
vice and consent burden through administrative maneuvering. And with 
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